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Case Study: Drafting Indemnity Clauses'
Experiences of the Southern Pacific Company
In Non-Public Carrier Contracts
By RICHARD J. LAT-ROPt
The necessity of railroads competing actively for its business has
pushed most railroads into fields far removed from railroading as it
has been pictured in novels and motion pictures. Eager to secure any
income from its properties, the railroad not only is willing to listen to
any proposal, but has designated employees to seek out opportunities
for the economic development of its properties, whether or not related
to railroading. Since Southern Pacific Company, for example, owns
some 3,800,000 acres of land not presently used for railroad purposes,
the variety of activities in which it finds itself is amazing.
Meeting the Contingent Liabilities
In preparing the contracts to cover these varied activities, it is
important that expenses which may arise from such uses be anticipated
as accurately as possible, in order intelligently to determine whether
the proposal should be accepted or rejected. The current tendency to
litigate any claim, and the publicity given to substantial judgments
awarded by generous juries, make the contingency of liability for bod-
ily injury or property damage an expense to be anticipated in any
commercial situation. Such contingent liability should, then, be con-
sidered by all parties to the transaction and agreement reached by them
as to its apportionment between them. To peer into the crystal ball to
predict what hazards will arise in connection with the enterprise, to
ascertain the intentions of the parties as to assumption of such hazards,
to apply the proper legal principles to the situation, and to calculate
the probable interpretation which will be made by the courts of the
* This article deals primarily with indemnity clauses but necessarily will include
some discussion of exculpatory clauses. It is based on experiences of the Southern Pacific
Company and is intended to indicate some of the considerations, legal and practical,
used by counsel in drafting such clauses. The article is limited to discussion of contracts
of the Company in its activities other than those of a common carrier, so that the prin-
ciples might be generally applicable and not subject to restrictions and circumstances
peculiar to common carriers.
I A.B. 1935, LL.B. 1938, University of Utah; member California and Utah bars;
Practitioner before Interstate Commerce Commission; Contracts Attorney, Southern
Pacific Company.
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-agreement drawn-this is the role of the contract attorney. Since South-
ern Pacific Company enters into contracts at a rate somewhat in excess
of 1000 per month, our experiences have been many and varied. In a
large number of these contracts, the railroad company is not acting as
a common carrier, and so the rules applicable to it are no different
from those encountered in general commercial practice.
Factors Used in Contract Formulation
We have found that many factors enter into the formulation of our
contracts, and that these are by no means limited to application of legal
principles, but nevertheless control the preparation of the contract.
Economic and psychological factors often have as much weight in the
determination of the contract phraseology as do the rules of law which
can be brought to bear. It would serve little purpose to draw a contract
which would clearly set forth all of the rights of your client if the other
party would not sign it. While it is necessary to recognize the legal
principles applicable to any situation, the economics will generally con-
trol, and often a choice of wording will determine whether the con-
tract will be acceptable, even though the legal results from either
wording would be the same.
We will, therefore, consider these factors, even though they cannot
be supported by case citations. As a matter of fact, extensive citation
of supporting and contradictory cases has not been considered appro-
priate to this article, for to the contract draftsman it should make little
difference whether the weight of authority is on one side or the other.
The weight of authority will shift from year to year and from juris-
diction to jurisdiction; hence the matter should be so drafted as to
avoid the necessity for interpretation or litigation. While easy to state
in such pontifical fashion, this goal, of course, is difficult to reach, for
the matter readily agreed upon today may become highly argumenta-
tive tomorrow. The point is that in preparation of the contract, it is not
sufficient to choose the wording that will be supported in the event of
litigation-the litigation should be avoided.
Turning then to that contractual situation most frequently encoun-
tered by the railroad company apart from its common carrier activities,
and where it is most important that the liability attendant upon the
situation be specified by contract, let us see some of the factors which
have developed our form of contract. The most common situation and
that with which we are now dealing is the commercial lease; that is,
where properties of the railroad not currently required for railroad use
are rented to another for his commercial endeavors. The only interest
of the railroad is in securing a return from property which otherwise
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would be idle until required for railroad purposes, and in the meantime
would require payment of property taxes.
We have mentioned that the first factor will be the intent of the
parties and that ultimately this should govern. This oft-quoted aph-
orism is misleading in its simplicity. The lessor intends that he shall get
a prescribed rental for use of his premises and that all else is the sole
concern of the lessee; the lessee intends that for the rental he is paying
he will receive premises guaranteed satisfactory for his intended use.
There is nothing necessarily contradictory in these two intentions and
they both may be preserved in the lease contract, but it is apparent
that there is a considerable void here in which neither party has yet
formulated any intention. If a customer of the lessee is injured and
sues both lessor and lessee, should the lessee assume the entire expense
incident to such injury? If so, then there must be some contractual pro-
vision shifting this expense from the lessor to the lessee, for in some
cases the lessor will retain a responsibilty regardless of the fact that he
has no longer any active control of the premises. If the lessor's em-
ployee is contributorily negligent, then the question arises as to what
division of the responsibility should be made. If the lessor's employee
is the sole cause of the injury, it is possible that the parties may intend
a different allocation of the expenses. Seldom is any thought given to
such detailed situations, yet in any specific instance the difference to
either party may be measured in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.
If the lessor is to be completely exonerated from expense incident to
such accidents, then there must be a contractual provision shifting lia-
bility from one party to the other. It must be largely up to the attorney
first to develop the intention of the parties, then to express the intent
in the contract.
Exculpatory and Indemnity Clauses
If the lessee is to assume any of the liability which would be placed
upon the lessor in the absence of agreement, the lease agreement should
include an exculpatory and indemnity clause. For our contract pur-
poses, it should be sufficient at this point to recognize the distinction
between indemnification and exculpation, and consider that our indem-
nity clause will generally include exculpation. It has been stated that
"the exculpatory clause deprives one of the contracting parties of his
right to recover for damages suffered due to the negligent act of the
other. The indemnity contract simply effects a change in the person who
ultimately has to pay for the damages."' There would be some differ-
ences in the event of litigation, for different technicalities of interpreta-
1 Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8, at 21 (1948).
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tion might be applied. If the contractual provision is drawn to include
the words "release and indemnify," the coverage should be sufficiently
broad.
The matter of negligence and responsibility therefore is one of the
most troublesome in negotiation of a contract which is intended to fix
liability between the parties, shifting it from one to the other if this is
necessary to meet their intentions. There is, of course, an instant re-
action against the assumption of any responsibility for the negligence
of another. From a practical standpoint there often should be no such
objection.
Right-of-Way Contracts
The best example of this is in connection with another type of con-
tract of which any railroad has hundreds. Extending through thousands
of communities in the states through which it operates, the privately
owned railroad right-of-way could easily become a Chinese wall block-
ing any movement across it. It therefore becomes necessary (often by
statutory requirement) for the railroad to enter into agreements per-
mitting, and to some extent controlling, the crossing of its right-of-way
by other parties. Obviously such crossings are of no benefit to the rail-
road, but on the other hand constitute a real hazard to its normal
operations. The other party has best control of the situation, for he
may delay his crossing of the tracks with little or no difficulty, while
it is manifestly impractical to bring a freight train to a stop in order
to permit a farmer to drive across the tracks. It seems only equitable
that the railroad in such a case should not be required to assume the
risk for normal use of the crossing. Here is a situation in which a haz-
ardous condition has been established upon railroad property (which
was acquired partly to avoid just such hazard) entirely for the benefit
of the other party and where such party has more control over the
hazard than the railroad. It is to be anticipated in such a situation
that if a lawsuit is based upon a crossing accident, negligence upon
the part of the railroad will be alleged whether or not the other
party has substantial evidence or any evidence at all to support such
an allegation.
In order to provide any protection for the railroad company, then,
the indemnification of the railroad company by the user should include
any accidents even though there has been contributory negligence on
the part of a railroad employee. In such cases, from a theoretical stand-
point, it would be reasonable for the railroad to assume the risk of any
accidents due to the sole negligence of its employees, but if such a pro-
vision were placed in the contract the net result would be a lease with
no real contractual protection for the railroad company. The plaintiff
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(or his insurance company) would in any such crossing case allege
almost as a matter of course that the accident was solely caused by the
negligence of the railroad employee in his failure to stop in time after
becoming aware of the crossing user, or in failure to blow a whistle.
The railroad would then have two alternatives: to proceed to trial
with the necessity of establishing negligence on the part of the plaintiff,
or to settle the claim on the best terms available. This might not be
objectionable, for at least the railroad could defend itself by proving
negligence on the part of the other party. The situation is much worse,
however, if there is a guest in the car who cannot be charged with the
driver's negligence. In such a case, the railroad must be able to estab-
lish complete absence of negligence on its part, an almost impossible
task in any crossing case. Unless the contract shifts to the crossing user
all liability in connection with use of the crossing, whether or not there
was negligence on the part of the railroad, the crossing will be largely
at the risk of the railroad, even though it in no way benefits from the
presence of the crossing and has no realistic control over its use.
Commercial Leases
The same holds true in the commercial lease situation, except only
that the railroad receives some rental to offset the tax burden on the
land. The use is by the lessee who derives the principal benefit from
the lease and has the control of such use. Having determined that the
parties intend that all risk incident to his use of the premises should be
placed upon the lessee, that it is necessary to shift the burden by con-
tractual provision, and that the provision should extend to the lessor's
negligence, let us proceed to some of the factors that will determine
the contract phraseology.
Since our intention as a lessor is to place all of the risk upon the
lessee, it would seem that the simplest approach would be to state cate-
gorically that all the risk is on the lessee. A contract placing upon the
lessee responsibility for damages on the leased premises "from any
cause whatsoever" should certainly be about as broad as could be
drawn. This very breadth defeats such phraseology, for the courts have
held that the intention of the parties in such cases did not include any
negligence on the part of the lessor, or the parties would have so spe-
cified.2 There are many cases reaching this conclusion, with quite an
assortment of reasons for reaching it, and quite a few fine distinctions
made, most by way of dicta. It has been stated, for instance, that such
general wording does not extend to "affirmative negligence" as in the
2 Barkett v. Brucato, 122 Cal. App. 2d 264, 264 P.2d 978 (1953).
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cited case, or to "active negligence"3 and "gross" and "wilful" negli-
gence generally seem to be excluded.
Generally, public policy is cited as being against excusing one from
his own negligent conduct, with many references to "inciting careless-
ness," "public duty," and "relative bargaining power." The Restatement
of Contracts suggests that a bargain for exemption from liability should
be valid except as to gross or wilful negligence, unless there is an
employer-employee relationship or one of the parties is charged with
a duty of public service.4 The courts have not yet evolved a clear posi-
tion in the matter, and so from a contract standpoint we must conclude
that the indemnity clause must clearly include negligence on the part
of the indemnitee.
California courts apparently will follow what they state is the gen-
eral rule: "[i]ntent to indemnify a party from the consequences of its
own negligence must be expressed in clear and explicit words."5 It
has been held, however, that it is not necessary to make specific refer-
ence to negligence if the contract is clear.6 In Oregon, some distinction
has been made in extending the indemnity to cases of joint negligence,
but not to sole negligence.7 We are not here concerned with what re-
sults might be expected in litigation of the matter; suffice it to note
that there has been considerable discussion of the point in law reviews
and in annotations."
Possibility of Insurance
Here we should mention a factor which in most cases will overcome
the lessee's objection to the indemnity clause in the lease agreement,
and to a degree should overcome the objection of public policy asserted
to be against such a clause. It is only realistic to recognize that there is
hazard attached to use of real property for any purpose whatsoever,
and prudent to provide for meeting expenses arising from such hazards.
Good business practice would be to insure against all such expense,
accepting the premium for such insurance as a normal business expense.
This practice is common enough that a standard Owner's, Landlord's
and Tenant's Liability Policy is issued by many insurance carriers,
which standard policy at present includes the risk assumed by the
3 Butt v. Bertola, 110 Cal. App. 2d 128, 242 P.2d 32 (1952).
4 tEsTATEME, CONTRACTS §§ 575, 576 (1932).
5 County of Alameda v. So. Pac. Co., 4 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1960) [hearing on appeal
pending before Supreme Court]; Vinnel Co. v. Pac. Elec. Ry., 52 Cal. 2d 411, 340 P.2d
604 (1959).
6 Harvey Machine Co. v. Hatzel & Buehler, 54 Cal. 2d .. 353 P.2d 924, 6 Cal.
Reptr. 284 (1960).
7 Booth-Kelly Lumber Co. v. So. Pac. Co., 183 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1950).
8 See, e.g., Annot. 175 A.L.R. 12 (1948).
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indemnity clause we would include in the lease agreement. The prac-
tice of including the indemnity clause in the lease and taking out insur-
ance against expense incurred thereby permits both parties to calculate
their expenses in the transaction accurately. The premium may be ad-
justed to fit the hazards presented by the proposed use, and possible
liabilities which would make the proposition unattractive to one party
or the other are eliminated.
It is apparent that it is to the benefit of both parties that this insur-
ance should be taken out by the lessee, with premiums paid by him
directly. If the lessor should assume such expense, either through pay-
ment of the premium or through assumption of the risk directly by
elimination of the indemnity clause, it would be necessary to increase
the rent by enough to cover the premium, plus lessor's overhead in
carrying this, plus taxes on the added amount. It is unfortunate that
this insurance approach is so unfamiliar and so little used. A word of
caution is in order as to the insurance policy itself. In many standard
forms, the insurance is against damage arising from defined hazards
and "caused by accident." Such wording excludes coverage for damage
caused by improper operations of the tenant, which may or may not be
acceptable. It generally is not difficult to secure an endorsement plac-
ing coverage on an "occurrence" basis rather than the "accident" basis.
The broader coverage is desirable if there is little or no added premium
cost.
Contracts With Governmental Bodies
In view of the increasing activity of all levels of governmental bodies,
and their entry into more and more fields, it is not surprising that a
large corporation should have a great number of contracts of various
sorts with different governmental bodies. It is, however, somewhat
surprising that, under our political philosophy which tends to deny or
restrict special privileges to government, that there should be such a
distinction between the terms expected by governmental bodies from
others and those they are willing to grant to others.
This is most noticeable with respect to the use of indemnity clauses.
It has become common practice to include an indemnity clause in a
lease agreement, the lessee indemnifying the landlord against hazards
arising from his tenancy. Most governmental agencies conform happily
to this custom when they are in the landlord's position, but feel con-
strained to refuse any indemnification clause at all when they are the
lessee.
We have been presented with what must surely be considered an
extreme case in such dealings with a state agency-not in California.
In this case the state agency desired to rent space to operate a liquor
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store. The printed form submitted by the state not only required the
lessor to guarantee that the proposed use would not be contrary to any
property restrictions, which would be reasonable, but required the
lessor to warrant that the operations of the lessee would not be in vio-
lation of any ordinance or statute, and further required the lessor to
indemnify the lessee against any loss resulting from the existence of
any such ordinances or statutes which might be violated by the lessee's
operations. When we declined thus to indemnify the state against its
own illegal acts, there was considerable consternation, since this was
their lease form in general use for years, and it had never before been
questioned. It should come as no surprise that when leasing its prop-
erties, that state requires that the lessee fully indemnify the state.
Claim of Legal Inability to Indemnify
The point here made is that in dealings with any governmental
body, it is to be expected that it will claim a legal inability to make
any indemnification. Generally, it is claimed that such a clause would
be a gift of public money, or a loaning of public credit. For example,
the California Constitution provides:9
The Legislature shall have no power to give or to lend, or to author-
ize the giving or lending, of the credit of the state, or of any county,
city and county, city, township or other political corporation or sub-
division of the state now existing, or that may hereafter be established
in aid of or to any person, association or corporation, whether munic-
ipal or otherwise, or to pledge the credit thereof, in any manner
whatever....
Also article XII, section 13, provides: "the state shall not in any
manner loan its credit ... ." And section 23007 of the Government
Code provides that "except as specified in this article, a county shall
not, in any manner, give or loan its credit to or in aid of any person or
corporation. An indebtedness or liability incurred contrary to this article
is void." Reference generally is made to the opinion expressed by the
Attorney General where it was declared that a county could not execute
an indemnity clause as it would be a loan of the county's credit.' °
There has been considerable litigation on the validity of indemnity
clauses executed by governmental agencies, with some divergence of
opinion both in the results and in the reasoning by which the results
were reached. As we above pointed out, from a contract standpoint,
this is sufficient to dictate that the contract should be drawn without
relying on the validity of such a clause, and we need not here consider
what may be the majority rule, or the probable result in California. We
9 CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 31.
"06 OPS CAL. ATT'y GNar. 41 (1945).
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may note in passing, however, that the courts have often placed con-
siderable weight on whether or not the clause could be extended to
cover negligence on the part of the indemnitee, and if it could be so
extended, it would be considered invalid. Courts have also given con-
siderable weight to the fact that any recovery would be limited in
amount or recovered only from a certain fund.
The safest course must be to consider that in the event of litigation,
the indemnification clause would be no guarantee of success. Here
again let us note that other factors may dictate the inclusion of such a
clause, for it can do no harm to the indemnitee in the event of litiga-
tion, cases could be cited supporting the validity of such clauses, and
presence of such a clause would probably be given much weight by a
city council or other administrative body in determining the settle-
ment of any claim against it.
Nature of Transaction
The distinction most often made in indemnity clauses executed by
governmental bodies is based on the nature of the transaction in con-
nection with which it was given. If the agency was acting in a govern-
mental capacity, it is said, the constitutional proscriptions apply and
the clause is invalid; but if the agency was acting in a proprietary
capacity, then it is no better off than any other businessman.
The distinction between governmental and proprietary activities
is so wavy in many cases as to make reliance upon this distinction some-
what hazardous. A more serious hazard, it would seem, is that no such
distinction is made either in the constitutional provision or applicable
statute. The constitutional proscription "' is particularly strong, forbid-
ding the giving or lending of the credit of the state or any county, city,
township or other political subdivision in any manner whatever. If this
is wrong because it may be a threat to the solvency of the public body,
the threat is no less great because the threat was incurred in a business
transaction. If anything, it would seem more reasonable for the political
subdivision to stake its credit in support of its governmental actions.
If the objection is that this may be a gift of public money, as forbidden
by the second part of the constitutional provision, it would seem that
value should be demanded just as much in connection with business
activities as with governmental functions. In either case, public monies
are to be affected.
Apparently, the conclusion to be reached from a contractual stand-
point is that indemnification from a governmental body cannot conclu-
sively be relied upon in the event of litigation, but nevertheless may
11 See note 9 supra.
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have some value short of litigation and even in the event of litigation
could be supported by case citation. Application of appropriate tech-
nicalities of interpretation could well justify sustaining the validity of
the indemnification. Insurance coverage would be the practical solution.
Psychology and the Wording of Clauses
In determining the precise wording to be included in an indemnity
clause, the psychological factors may be even more important than
the applicable rules of law. In the course of the development of indem-
nity clauses to be used in lease forms, we at one time concluded the
clause with the words "regardless of any negligence on the part of the
railroad." This wording met with such serious resistance that it seemed
necessary to revise the clause.
Reviewing other forms that contained indemnity clauses, we found
one that had been in use for several years which concluded with
the words "regardless of any negligence or alleged negligence on the
part of Railroad employees." Investigation developed that no objec-
tions had been received to this wording. As a matter of interest, we
submitted this wording to several of those who had objected to the
first phraseology, and it was accepted without protest. It would be dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to explain the reasoning which would lead
anyone to accept the one wording and reject the other, for certainly
there is no difference in the legal effect when the party to be exculpated
from the consequences of its negligence is a corporation that can act
only through its employees.
Since it is desirable to make it clear that the indemnity clause does
include negligence on the part of the indemnitee, and use of the word
"negligence" in the clause may make it objectionable despite its prob-
able insurability, we presently are using in some such cases the wording
"regardless of any act or omission on the part of Railroad employees."
This seems clearly to include negligent acts or omissions, and does not
seem to meet with the objections to which the other wording is subject.
In shifting the expenses of a tenancy from the landlord to the ten-
ant, the principal concern is the cost and expense which the landlord
may incur incident to the tenancy. This has led to the typical wording
of the indemnity clause, covering "cost and expense" incurred by the
indemnitee. Under such a clause, it is necessary for the indemnitee to
pay the cost and expense before he can require the indemnitor to reim-
burse him. This is not as effective protection as it would be to have
the indemnitor make the payment initially. In most cases, this can be
accomplished by extending the indemnity clause to include liability
incurred by the indemnitee. The indemnification will then be against
Nov., 1960] CASE STUDY ON DRAFTING
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"liability, cost and expense" incurred by the indemnitee and arising
from the transaction between the parties. This position seems to be
rather generally established and accepted in most jurisdictions.12
The Insupportable Clause
Just as we have found that some contracts may be acceptable or
objectionable depending sometimes upon the choice made between
words having the same legal effect, so also do we often find it desirable
to include in a contract some provisions which might not be supported
by a court following the current weight of authority. It is obvious that
case law will change from year to year, just as statutory law will, and
it may well be that a controversial provision will develop into the decid-
ing factor in settlement of a contract dispute. More important, it should
be remembered that in all probability the contract will not be subjected
to the interpretation of a court, but will serve as a reminder to both
parties of what their intention was at the time the contract was en-
tered into.
We are not, of course, speaking of any agreement which would be
illegal or contrary to the intent of the parties, but rather a provision
that expresses their intent within the law. Thus we may secure a full
indemnification from a governmental body, realizing that in the event
of litigation the court in applying the technicalities of public policy,
pledging of public credit, and distinguishing between governmental
and proprietary functions, may not give full force to the indemnnifica-
tion. Usually, the parties will arrive at a settlement without resorting
to litigation, and the matter will be disposed of as the parties intended.
The hazard here is not so much that litigation will be lost as that the
client may rely fully on the contractual protection without any realiza-
tion that there is a possibility of losing. This, of course, makes him no
different from any other client, all of whom expect to prevail in any
lawsuit.
Reflections and Conclusions
We have seen, then, that in the preparation of a contract which is
designed to shift some liability from one of the contracting parties to
the other, it will be necessary to include the indemnitee's sole and con-
tributory negligence by clear reference, preferably with a requirement
that the contractual liability be insured, and with a recognition that in
view of the many technicalities involved there may be difficulty in
sustaining some provisions in the event litigation makes it necessary
12 27 Am. JuR. Indemnity § 20 et seq. (1939).
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for a court to interpret the intentions of the parties.
The contract draftsman will of course, realize that in many cases
the parties will not agree upon the complete indemnification we have
discussed, and that for any of the economic, psychological or legal rea-
sons we have mentioned they will prefer to stop short of that coverage.
The most frequent modification we have encountered relates to negli-
gence, and is required by the refusal of the indemnitor to assume any
responsibility for the sole negligence of the indemnitee. In such a case,
we have found the most acceptable phrasing to be to conclude the in-
demnity clause with the words "except when due to the sole negligence
of" the indemnitee. The only reference to negligence being in the ex-
clusion, the question may be raised whether the parties intended to
include any negligence by the indemnitee, but it would seem clearly
indicated that the parties were contemplating the effects of negligence
and intentionally excluded only sole negligence, thus necessarily re-
taining coverage for joint negligence. We know of no judicial interpre-
tation of this precise point, but feel it should be upheld. At any rate,
it has been found acceptable from the standpoint of negotiations, and
attorneys on both sides have agreed in our interpretation.
Other modifications may be required by individual factual situa-
tions. It may be, also, that the circumstances will dictate use of an
exculpatory clause only, without full indemnification. This coverage
will be rather restricted, limited as it is to a release of one of the parties
by the other.
In this particular field of the law, we must conclude that it is nec-
essary to be as specific as is possible in dealing with future situations,
keeping abreast of the constantly changing rules of interpretation de-
veloped by our courts.
As a matter of interest, we set out in conclusion the indemnity
clause presently used in our commercial leases. This is by no means a
model contractual provision, for its development has been influenced
greatly by some of the factors other than legal to which reference has
been made. Further changes will be made, and in fact some are now
being contemplated. Like the government, a large corporation must
move through established channels, with the obvious delays resulting.
The clause reads:
Lessee agrees to release and indemnify Railroad from and against
all liability, cost and expense for loss of or damage to property and for
injury to or deaths of persons (including, but not limited to the prop-
perty and employees of each party hereto), when arising or resulting
from:
(a) The use of said premises by Lessee, its agents, employees or in-
vitees, or
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(b) breach of the provisions of this lease by Lessee
whether or not caused or contributed to by any act or omission of
Railroad, its employees, agents, contractors, subcontractors or their
employees or agents, or any other person.
Lessee, upon request, will provide Railroad with certified copies
of insurance in form and amounts satisfactory to Railroad, insuring
the liability of Lessee under this agreement.
